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I. DIVORCE AND ALIMONY
The statistics tell the dramatic story of the disappearing per-
manence of American marriages. They tend to make a mockery
of the sacramental phrases which are traditionally used to tie the
bonds of matrimony. In the United States the number of divorces
per 100 marriages occurring in the same year was estimated in
1867 to be 2.8; in 1890, 5.8; in 1910, 8.8; in 1930, 17.4; in 1949, 25.1;
and in 1950, 23.1.'
Each year in the United States 400,000 divorces and annul-
ments are granted.2  There are about 7,000,000 divorced spouses
in our country at any one time. On the basis of these present
trends, almost one out of every three marriages entered into in
this country in the past ten years will end in divorce.
Out of this rising amount of divorce litigation there also arises
the problem of alimony. It must be agreed that few subjects in
the law are capable of kindling so much emotion as that of alimony.
In order to understand this established pattern in which men
are to provide for women and women are to be provided for, we
must go back to the common law. For it is the common law which
created the unity between husband and wife and made the hus-
band the dominant partner in that unity. A married man under
• B.A., 1953, University of Kansas City; LL.B., 1956; LL.M., 1957; co-
author with Judge Harry G. Miller, Jr. of "Kansas Civil Procedure"
casebook, 1957; Teaching Associate, University of Nebraska College
of Law, 1958; member of Kansas, Nebraska and Missouri Bar As-
sociations; presently associated with Ross and Wells, Kansas City,
Kansas.
1 Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability,
9 Vand. L. Rev. 633 (1956). See generally Cahen, Statistical Analysis
of American Divorce, p. 27; Ireland and de Gelindey, Divorce in the
Americas, p. 7 (1947); Oglurn, The Family and Its Functions, 1 Recent
Social Trends 13 (1933): "One marriage in six in the United States
results in divorce."
2 Pilpel and Zavin, Your Marriage and The Law, p. 297 (1952).
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the common law held virtually complete control and management
of his wife's real and personal property. If a husband had solid
privileges in his wife's property and estate, he also had correspond-
ing obligations. The wife was the housekeeper, rendering her
services in childbearing and in home duties, without compensation.
Obviously, it must fall to the husband to support the family. It
was in this era of total wife dependency and nonenity at law that
the equitable rule of alimony sprang up.
The courts generally fail to recognize the tremendous change
that has taken place in the social and economic status of women
in the United States. Too often it still seems evident that the
alimony award is based on the Victorian attitude toward women.3
It has been only recently that judges, in determining the alimony
award, have taken into consideration that women compete on an
equal basis with men for economic opportunities. It would appear
that it would be far better for a woman's morale, her self-respect,
and her personal and social well-being, to be financially dependent
only. upon her own efforts.
This paper represents an attempt to appraise the aspects of
one small section of the alimony law that allows the modification
of alimony awards. Two issues are to be considered. They, are:
what factors are taken into consideration by the courts when
making the original alimony awards and what is the effect of res
judicata as to the original award, or when may the alimony award
be modified up or down. Preliminarily, as a necessary backdrop
to a discussion of res judicata, it is necessary to discuss the factors
which are originally taken into consideration when the courts
grant the original decree of alimony.
A. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN AWARDING ALIMONY
As was stated previously, the basic purpose of alimony is
founded upon the natural and legal duty of the husband to support
his wife. Alimony is not intended as a penalty against him, nor
as a reward for her virtue. 4 Alimony awards are supposed to be
3 Borchers v. Borchers, 254 Wisc. 302, 36 N.W.2d 79 (1949); Christiano v.
Christiano, 131 Conn. 589, 41 A.2d 779 (1945); Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn.
256, 152 A. 302 (1930); Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236(1905); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y. 566, 29 N.E. 826, 14 L.R.A. 712
(1892).
4 Noel v. Noel, 206 Okl. 16, 240 P.2d 739 (1952); Cecil v. Cecil, 179 Va.
274, 19 S.E.2d 64 (1942); Hulcher v. Hulcher, 177 Va. 12, 12 S.E.2d 767
(1941); Haskell v. Haskell, 119 Minn. 484, 138 N.W. 787 (1912).
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based on the husband's ability to pay and on the wife's needs.
There are a number of elements properly cognizable in determining
the right to and the amount of alimony.
1. Ability of Husband to Pay
The financial position of the husband, his ability to pay an
award, is perhaps the most vital factor in determining the amount
of alimony. This ability of the husband to pay will be determined
by a consideration of all his economic resources and potential.
The principle was stated by the New Jersey Court as follows in
Hess v. Hess:5
The rule is well settled . . . that while the husband's current
income is the primary fund looked to for his wife's support where
they are separated, nevertheless, the husband's property and capi-
tal assets and his capacity to earn the support awarded by diligent
attention to business-his earning capacity or prospective earnings
-are all proper elements for the court's consideration in fixing
the amount of the award.
The amount of alimony which is set must be within the capacity
of the husband to pay; otherwise an award of alimony becomes
a futile gesture. Courts therefore recognize that a lesser amount
awarded which is collectible, is a sounder award than a larger one
of doubtful collectibility.
A good example of this reasoning is found in Commonwealth
ex rel Layarou v. Layarou.6 In this case at the time of the divorce
action the husband had just graduated from medical school and
was to begin his internship at a hospital where he would earn
$75 a month. The wife was a school teacher earning $2800 a year.
After the hearing the lower court entered an order for alimony
of $100 per month. On appeal the Pennsylvania Superior Court
reduced the alimony to $15 a month stating that when the husband
has completed his training and becomes a qualified physician his
financial situation of course will be greatly improved and this
will enure to the benefit of his wife. Until that time, however,
he has only limited resources and his wife must bear this hardship
which she would have borne had they not separated.
It must be remembered, however, that the ability of the hus-
band to pay is just one of the considerations and that the amount
of alimony allowed is affected by other considerations.
5 134 N.J.Eq. 360, 35 A.2d 677 (1944).
6 180 Pa. Super. 342, 119 A.2d 605 (1956).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
2. Needs of the Wife
Permanent alimony,7 the courts believe, must necessarily be
measured by the needs of the wife. A wife who is young, vigorous
and healthy, who has worked in the past and who obviously can
work in the future, should not be granted the same alimony as
a wife who is considerably older, in poor health, and unable to
work.
Unfortunately, courts frequently make alimony awards to
women who are well able to take care of themselves, because they
feel that the primary obligation to support an ex-wife falls upon
the husband.8 Wives may, therefore, be awarded alimony who by
no stretch of the imagination can be said to be in necessitous cir-
cumstances.
In Kittle v. Kittle,9 it was held that the husband is bound to
support his wife, according to his financial ability, out of his in-
come, which is the proper basis of any decree against him, and
the wife's capacity to earn a living, or her ownership of a separate
estate cannot be properly taken into consideration.
There are, fortunately, some courts that do take into account
the wife's earnings and separate estate or income when setting
the amount to be provided by an order for alimony.10
3. Duration of Marriage
The duration of the marriage is another important element
which courts take into account in awarding alimony. The feeling
seems to be the longer a woman has lived with a man and per-
7 Permanent alimony is defined by the Florida Court: "Permanent
alimony is not a sum of money or specific portion of the husband's
estate given absolutely to the wife but is a continuous allotment of
a sum payable at regular periods for her support from year to year."
Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So.2d 6 (1948).
8 Waldrop v. Waldrop, 222 Ala. 625, 134 So. 1 (1931) the court stated:
"We would make it plain that a husband in Alabama cannot cast off
his wife and relieve himself of the duty to support because she is
able to take care of herself by her work."
9 86 W. Va. 46, 102 S.E. 799 (1920). See also: Bamboschek v. Bambo-
schek, 150 Misc. 885, 270 N.Y.S. 741, Mod. 271 N.Y.S. 1097 (1934);
Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 236 S.W. 938 (1922).
10 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 211 Fla.2d 779, 63 So.2d 196 (1953); Spalding
v. Spalding, 280 App. Div. 836, 114 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1952); Wilkins v.
Wilkins, 84 Neb. 206, 120 N.W. 907 (1909).
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formed the functions which one normally expects from a wife, the
greater is her claim against him.:"
4. Guilt of Parties
The conduct of the parties is more than a factor which is taken
into account by the courts in setting the amount of alimony to
award. Success in the divorce action is almost an indispensable
prerequisite to alimony in most states. This concept of the guilty
party or of rewarding the innocent and punishing the guilty is
derived from the ecclesiastical court. The theory as applied to
the wife by some courts seems to be to the effect that there can
be no award of alimony to a guilty wife. There seems to be a
failure to realize that a guilty wife may starve just as easily as
an innocent one.
Many courts share the view of the Montana Supreme Court
as expressed in Grush v. Grush12 when it stated:
Where the divorce is granted for an offense of the wife, the
court is without authority to make an award to her of permanent
alimony. An attempted award under such circumstances is with-
out jurisdiction and void, subject to direct or collateral attack at
any time and is unaffected by the consent of the parties.
While most courts subscribe to the view that the allowance
or the amount of alimony should not be used as a punitive measure
or as a penalty against the husband when the divorce is decreed
against him, there can be little doubt that the nature of the hus-
band's misconduct as compared with that of the wife, influences
the amount of alimony that is granted.
This was bluntly expressed by the New Jersey Court in
Weigand v. Weigand13 which stated that, while:
The court can give nothing by way of punishment, .. . where
the conduct of the wife has been blameless and that of the hus-
band has been almost atrociously cruel and grossly indecent and
his means are ample, it ought in awarding alimony to exercise ajust liberality.
11 Collins v. Collins, 182 Okl. 246, 77 P.2d 74 (1938).
12 90 Mont. 381, 386, 3 P.2d 402, 403 (1931); See also: Leach v. Leach,
261 Wis. 350, 52 N.W.2d 896 (1952); Ex parte McKenna, 116 Cal. App.
232, 2 P.2d 429 (1931); Hulman v. Hulman, 155 Ky. 493, 159 S.W. 937
(1931); Friend v. Friend, 65 Wis. 412, 27 N.W. 34 (1886).
'3 41 N.J.Eq. 202, 210, 3 A. 699, 704 (1886).
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B. JuDIcIAL DISCRETION
An examination of the law and practice relating to alimony
indicates that judicial discretion plays a very important role in
the making of alimony awards and their amounts. The question
of if and how much alimony will be awarded in any given case
is difficult to answer. In the majority of the jurisdictions this
problem is left to the discretion of the judge.
There are few legal criteria to guide the exercise of this. dis-
cretion. Terms used in alimony statutes such as "just", "reason-
able" and "as justice requires" are notorious for their flexibility
and for their vagueness.
There is also the fact that judgments may vary with the
personality of the judge. There are no doubt judges who are
generous with another man's money and property, just as there
are no doubt judges who regard alimony with disfavor.
Some states in an attempt to overcome this vagueness and
the influence of the personality of the judges entering into the
amount of the awards have set maximum limits on the amount
which a court can decree. For example, in Minnesota, 14 and
Maine, 15 a wife cannot be awarded more than one-third of her
husband's income. In Georgia 6 the amount to be awarded the
wife is fixed by a jury. If the jury specifies it is to be permanent
alimony, then it is not subject to later modification.
II. ALIMONY AWARD SUBSEQUENT TO
DIVORCE DECREE
It is the general rule that when a decree of divorce has been
entered and becomes final with no mention of alimony, and in
the absence of a statute authorizing the allowance of alimony
subsequent to the entry of a decree, the court is without power,
in the divorce proceeding or proceedings supplementary thereto,
to modify, by inserting an award for alimony, no matter how
drastic a change of circumstances occurred after the entry of the
decree. Especially is this true where alimony was- in issue on
the hearing in the divorce suit and then omitted from the de-
cree without fraud or mistake and the decree was rendered on
personal service or its' equivalent.
'4 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.22 (1945).
15 Me. Rev. Stat. c. 166, § 63 (1954).
16 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 30-207, 30-209 (1952).
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The granting of alimony subsequent to a divorce decree is
generally refused for one of the following reasons. First, that
the court has no jurisdiction to award alimony since the marital
status on which the power to award alimony depends no longer
exists. This was stated by the Iowa Supreme Court1 7 as follows:
The general ground upon which these holdings are based was
that alimony is an incident of the marriage relation; that it may
be allowed as a part of the decree of divorce; that the severance
of the marriage relation by absolute decree without alimony,
terminates the right to alimony....
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Eldred v. Eldred's to the
same effect said:
The marriage relation that existed between the present
plaintiff and defendant has been dissolved.... They are no
longer husband and wife. The duty and obligation that once
existed to support and maintain the plaintiff does not now rest
upon the defendant. He is no longer her husband, and no legal
obligation is imposed upon him to provide for her maintenance;
hence there exists no right to alimony.
Second, the final decree adjudicates the entire matter; and
a decree silent on the subject of alimony is res judicata on that
question. The wife is held to have waived the legal right to ask
that alimony be granted, either expressly or by failing to ask
for the same in the petition for divorce. 19 A party's opportunity
to raise an issue is often treated as the equivalent to raising the
issue.
The Ohio Appeals Court in Whitaker v. Whitaker2 1 said:
When both parties have had their day in court in the divorce
proceedings and permit the marriage contract to be severed with-
out at the same time having their support and maintenance rights
growing out of the same relation adjusted, it is held that they
have conclusively waived and withdrawn the consideration of
that question from the court. The courts will leave the parties
where they have placed themselves.
17 McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 975, 183 N.W. 377, 378 (1921).
18 62 Neb. 613, 615, 87 N.W. 340, 341 (1901). See generally: Staub v.
Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605 (1936); Heckert v. Heckert, 57 Ohio
App. 421, 14 N.E.2d 428 (1936); Watson v. Watson, 168 Ga. 530, 148
S.E. 386 (1929); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121 (1925);
Spain v. Spain, 177 Iowa 249, 158 N.W. 529 (1916).
19 Lee v. Palmer, 75 Ga. App. 752, 44 S.E.2d 516 (1947).
20 52 Ohio App. 223, 3 N.E.2d 667 (1936). See also: Allen v. Baker, 188
Ga. 696, 4 S.E.2d 642 (1939); Doeksen v. Doeksen, 202 Iowa 489, 210
N.W. 545 (1926); Cameron v. Cameron, 31 S.D. 335, 140 N.W. 700 (1913);
Weidman v. Weidman, 57 Ohio St. 101, 48 N.E. 506 (1897).
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Some wives have tried to get an award of alimony subsequent
to the decree of divorce under the statutes in various states which
provides for the modification of alimony decrees. The Michigan
Supreme Court answered this problem in Mack v. Mack2 ' as
follows:
Under a statute governing amendments of decree for alimony,
where original decree did not provide for alimony to wife or
reserve right to make such provision, the court could not modify
decree so as to award wife alimony.
To the same effect it was stated in Plummer v. Plummer
22
by the Maine Supreme Court as follows:
Furthermore statutes which authorize modifications of decrees
as to alimony or support do not apply where no alimony is granted
in the decree.
There are exceptions to the general rules as stated above, as
where a statute expressly authorizes an application for alimony
after the final decree of divorce, or where the court in its divorce
decree reserved for future adjudication the question of the right
of the wife to alimony. For example in Farris v. Kiriayis2 3 the
Illinois Appeals Court said:
Where final decree of divorce contained provision reserving
question of alimony . . . 'until further order of the court', the
reservation prevented the trial court's jurisdiction from being
exhausted upon entry of the decree, and hence the trial court
had jurisdiction to award alimony.
This case may be compared with the case of O'Brien v.
O'Brien24 where the court did not reserve the question of alimony.
The California Supreme Court held:
Where a final decree was entered without mentioning alimony
.. . or reserving jurisdiction . . . the court had no authority to
award alimony . . . since it lost jurisdiction of both the parties
and the subject-matter.
Such a reservation is the only way by which a wife may make
it possible for the court to grant her alimony if and when there
21 283 Mich. 365, 278 N.W. 99 (1938).
22 137 Me. 39, 41, 14 A.2d 705, 706 (1940). See also: McClure v. McClure,
4 Cal.2d 356, 49 P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 127 (1935); Bacigalupi v. Bacigalupi,
75 Cal. App. 654, 238 P. 93 (1925); Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Ill. 104, 147
N.E. 659 (1925); Bassett v. Bassett, 99 Wis. 344, 74 N.W. 780, 67 Am.
St. Rep. 863 (1898).
23 329 Ill. App. 225, 67 N.E.2d 701 (1946). Doerle v. Doerle, 96 Misc. 72,
159 N.Y.S. 637 (1916).
24 130 Cal. 409, 62 P. 598 (1900).
RES JUDICATA IN THE DIVORCE COURTS
is a change in the husband's financial condition where the hus-
band at the time of the entry of the divorce decree, is without
means to support his wife.
As stated above some jurisdictions have changed by statute
the general rule that a divorce decree rendered upon personal
service or its equivalent and silent on the question of alimony
precludes a later award of alimony. Four states25 expressly pro-
vide for an award of alimony after decree. In nearly all the other
states the language is such that it seems to refer to the time of
the decree only.
III. MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY AWARDS
Courts invested with jurisdiction and power to grant divorce
and to award alimony payable periodically or in installments are
usually deemed to have power to change or modify the amount
to be currently paid whenever the circumstances of the parties
have materially changed. Power to make such changes is ex-
pressly conferred by statute in many of the states. Where power
is so conferred, it is not necessary that it be reserved by the court
in making the award. But even in the absence of statutes grant-
ing such power, it is recognized that the court can reserve juris-
diction over its awards, and that such reservation is effective to
assure the court's continued control. Such a reservation can ef-
fectively be made even though the decree provisions are in ac-
cordance with an agreement of the parties.
The Washington Supreme Court in the case of Ruge v. Ruge 2
after. a careful analysis of the power of the court to modify the
amount of alimony concluded that the cases seem naturally to
arrange themselves into six well-defined and distinct classes, each
class being based upon sound fundamental principles and the rule
pertaining to it being the result of clear logic. They are as follows:
(1) Decree for separate maintenance. The continued exis-
tence of the status of marriage upon which the power to grant a
decree of alimony depends carried with it the continuing power
to modify or alter the allowance of alimony to meet new conditions.
(2) Alimony pendente lite or temporary alimony. The court
has the same power to modify its orders with respect to temporary
25 Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 40, § 19 (1956); Mass. Laws Ann. c. 208; § 34 (1952);
N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 2A:34-23 (1952); R.I. Gen Laws § 15-5-6 (1956).
26 97 Wash. 51, 165 P. 1063 (1917).
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alimony that it has to make any other appropriate order in a case
pending in court.
(3) Where there are minor children. The courts of all the
states are as one upon the proposition that, so far as the decree
of alimony is for the benefit of the minor children of the spouses,
the power to modify the decree continues.
(4) Where the court by express provision in its decree re-
serves to itself either all or a portion of its power to provide
alimony for the wife. In such cases the decree is not final and
conclusive as a matter of law.
(5) Where by statute in the particular jurisdiction power
is expressly conferred upon the court to from time to time, on
petition of either party, revise or alter its judgment or decree
respecting the amount of alimony.
(6) In all other cases no modification.
The court stated further; "When the question of alimony is
in fact actually litigated and finally determined in the divorce
action, a judgment or degree in the action operates as res judicata
upon the question of alimony."
A. STATUTES GOVERNING
There are thirty-four 27 states with statutes giving the courts
authority to alter decrees for alimony after the initial award.
In nearly all of these states revision of the award is usually left
within the discretion of the court. In these states where statutes
make revision of alimony discretionary with the court, specific
circumstances are rarely mentioned. Here again arises the prob-
27 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-321 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1213 (1947);
Cal. Civ. Code § 139 (1957); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7335 (1949); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 65-15 (1943); Idaho Code tit. 32-706 (1947); II1. Stat. Ann. c. 40,§ 19 (1956); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.14 (1946); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 166,
§ 63 (1954); Mass. Laws Ann. c. 208, § 37 (1952); Mich. Stat. Ann.§ 25.106 (1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.23 (1945); Miss. Code § 2743
(1942); Mo. Stat. Ann. § 452.070 (1949); Mont. Rev. Code tit. 21-139(1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-324 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150 (1955);
N. Hamp. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 458.19 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann. tit. 2A:34-23
(1952); N. Mex. Stat. c. 22-7-6 (1953); N.Y. Civ Prac. Act § 1155 (1955);
N. Dak. Rev. Code c. 14-0524 (1943); Or. Rev. Stat. c. 107.130 (1957);
R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 15-5-6 (1956); S. Car. Code of Laws § 20-116 (1952);
S. Dak. Code § 14-0725 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-820 (1956); Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953); Ver. Stat. § 3249 (1947); Va. Code § 20-109
(1950); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.08, 110 (1952); W. Va. Code § 4715 (1955);
Wis. Stat. Ann. c. 247.32 (1957); Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-5922 (1945).
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lem of the proper exercise of judicial discretion which was dis-
cussed previously in this article.
B. CONSIDERATIONS WHEN MODIFYING AN ALImONY DECREE
As discussed previously in this paper, there are a number of
elements properly cognizable in determining the right to and the
amount of alimony in the original divorce decree. They are again,
briefly, such things as ages of the parties, their condition of health,
the property and income of the husband, separate property and
income of the wife, if any, the station in life of the parties as they
have heretofore lived and the duration of the marriage. In the
ideal situation, on an application by either party for the modifi-
cation of a decree for alimony, the judge should again take into
consideration the above elements and then determine from the
evidence if there has been a substantial and material change in
any of them to justify either an increase or decrease, as the case
may be, in the original alimony award.
The original decree fixing alimony is an adjudication of the
courts as to what is right and proper at the time it is entered. To ob-
tain any change in it, a change in the circumstances of the parties
must be shown making a continuance of the original provision im-
proper and unfair. If there is such a change of circumstances wheth-
er by reason of reduced ability of the husband to pay or increased
needs of the ex-wife, the court has the power to change the amount
to be paid. This basic formula was stated in McLead v. McLead2s
in this way:
The amount of permanent alimony to be awarded depends
upon the necessity of the wife in her station of life and the ability
of the husband to pay. To increase the amount of alimony already
awarded a wife there must appear a necessity for the increased
allowance, and the ability of the husband to pay such an increase.
If there is no change in the situation of the parties, the court has
no power to act.29
The required changed conditions or circumstances to allow
modification must be substantial and material.3 0
28 131 N.J.Eq. 44, 23 A.2d 545, 547 (1942).
29 Felton v. Felton, 326 Ill. App. 444, 62 N.E.2d 39 (1945); Smith v. Smith,
299 Ky. 715, 187 S.W.2d 271 (1945); Pledger v. Pledger, 199 Ark. 604,
135 S.W.2d 851 (1940).
30 Quist v. Quist, 207 Minn. 257, 290 N.W. 561 (1940). The court said:
"To warrant a modification of an allowance fixed by a divorce decree
there must be proof of such substantial change in the situation of the
parties from that in which they were when the decree was rendered
as to justify a modification."
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The courts* have considerable range of power and discretion
and should exercise it cautiously. In Vert v. Vert3' it was said:
To justify the court in modifying its former judgment, it
should undoubtedly be satisfied that it is passing upon a different
state of facts than those already adjudicated upon; but what de-
gree of change is essential to constitute a different state of facts
must in general be addressed to the judicial discretion and judg-
ment of the trial court, the inquiry being whether sufficient cause
has intervened since its former judgment to authorize or require
the court applying equitable rules and principles to change the
allowance.
The power of the court to change the decree is not power to
grant a new trial or to retry the issues in the original hearing,
but only to adapt the decree to some distinct and definite change
in the circumstances or conditions of the parties.32 The Nebraska
Supreme Court3 3 had this to say: ". . . an application for a change
in the amount of alimony, after divorce, must be founded upon
new facts which have occurred since the decree was entered, and,
that in the absence of such facts, the matter is deemed to be res
adjudicata between the parties."
There seems to be no time limitation operating against a party
who seeks revision of an alimony decree and no restriction on the
number of times a petition may be brought.34 One thing the
courts are wary of, however, is attempts by parties to use a motion
to modify as an appeal.35 In this manner the parties are attempting
to appeal from the part of the decree with which they are dis-
satisfied without complying with the statutes and rules governing
appeals.
31 3 S.D. 619, 622, 54 N.W. 655 (1893). In Hagen v. Hagen, 212 Minn.
488, 4 N.W.2d 100 (1942) the Minnesota Court had this to say about
the judicial discretion: "This authority is to be exercised cautiously
and only upon new facts occuring after the judgment, or facts exist-
ing before the judgment of which a party was excusably ignorant
at the time when judgment was rendered. . ."
32 Nash v. Nash, 77 Ohio App. 156, 65 N.E.2d 728 (1945); Ellenstein v.
Ellenstein, 210 Minn. 265, 297 N.W. 848 (1941); Hill v. Hill, 266 Mich.
402, 254 N.W. 145 (1934).
33 Chambers v. Chambers, 75 Neb. 850, 106 N.W. 993 (1906).
34 McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W. 931, 33 L.R.A., N.S.,
1074 (1911). See also: Desverine, Grounds for the Modification of
Alimony Awards, 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 236 (1939).
35 Hein v. Hein, 127 Conn. 503, 18 A.2d 374 (1941); Glad v. Glad, 51
S.D. 574, 215 N.W. 931 (1927).
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1. Station in Life Rule
Many courts in awarding or in modifying alimony decrees
make some reference to the duty of the husband to support and
maintain his former wife in conformity with his condition and
station in life. The station in life rule seems to be equally an
important factor to be considered when modifying an alimony
award as when granting the original award. Few courts bother
to define what they mean by this term or what is their standard
of measurinig what is the parties station in life. The case that
comes nearest to a definition is Commonwealth v. Whiston36
where it was stated:
The 'pecuniary resources of the husband,' . . . have a bearing
upon the 'condition in life of the parties' and thus upon the 'ne-
cessities of the wife,' for has been recognized in considering the
liabilities of a husband for 'necessaries' supplied to his wife, the
term necessaries in this connection is not confined to articles of
food or clothing required to sustain life, but has a much broader
meaning and includes such articles for use by a wife as are suitable
to maintain her according to the property and conditions in life of
her husband.'
It is all very well to speak of the wife's right to support ac-
cording to the husband's station in life but, except for the very
rich, that standard is impossibly high; particularly when the hus-
band may have a former wife and a present new family to support.
One of the aspects of divorce is the economic catastrophe which it
brings. In rejecting the notion that a former wife is entitled to
exactly the same style of life as her husband the Supreme Court
of Delaware 37 recently said: "Any such absurd general holding
on our part would constantly fly in the face of the fundamentals
of economics ......
Obviously then, one of the most important considerations in
determining what constitutes support equal to the husband's sta-
tion in life is the ability of the husband to pay. In Hill v. Hill38
the Ohio Appeals Court stated it in this manner: "The station
in life of the parties and their accustomed manner of living are
pertinent but the financial ability of the husband to provide this
station in life . . . must in the last analysis control. . . ." This
factor has been regarded as more important than the parties' usual
36 306 Mass. 65, 27 N.E.2d 703 (1940). Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337,
18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Commonwealth v. McClelland, 109 Pa. Super.
211, 167 A. 367 (1933).
37 Du Pont v. Du Pont, 32 Del. Ch. 56, 103 A.2d 234 (1954).
38 94 Ohio App. 463, 115 N.E.2d 399 (1953).
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style of living in cases where the style of living was far beyond
the husband's means. The court should not modify a decree to
provide the wife with alimony for a station in life which is far
beyond the means of the husband. The modification must be
based on the husband's property, income and earning capacity
at the time of the hearing, not what they might have been in the
past.39
It seems the station in life rule had led the courts into a posi-
tion where a wife may be literally supported by both° a husband
and an ex-husband. Since the weight of authority supports the
conclusion of those cases which hold that remarriage of a divorced
wife does not of itself terminate the obligation of the former hus-
band to pay alimony, it is only necessary for her to show that her
second husband will be unable to support her in anything like
the station in life of the man whom she divorced.40  If she suc-
ceeds in establishing the inadequacy of the second husband's sup-
port, the former husband's alimony payments are not terminated.
2. Change in Financial Conditions or Circumstances
Another common ground for the modification of a decree for
alimony is that there has been a substantial change in the financial
condition of the husband and wife since the decree was entered.
Unfortunately, there is no general rule which can be stated as to
the amount of change in the financial conditions which is necessary
to require or permit a modification of a decree of alimony on this
ground. There is agreement, however, on the fact that the change
in financial circumstances necessary to justify a modification of
a decree for alimony must be material and substantial.
(a) Earning Capacity of Husband
The ability of the husband, from the viewpoint of his personal
earnings or his earning capacity, is certainly an element to be
considered by the court in determining whether the original ali-
mony decree should be modified. The husband may not escape
the obligations of an alimony decree by spending more than his
income especially where the income is a fair one.41 Nor, may he
do so by deliberately refusing to work or failing to take advantage
30 Jones v. Jones, 348 Pa. 411, 35 A.2d 270 (1944).
40 Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939); Dietrich v. Dietrich,
99 N.J.Eq. 711, 134 A. 338 (1926); Morgan v. Morgan, 203 Ala. 516,
84 So. 754 (1919).
41 Moore v. Moore, 163 Miss. 15, 140 So. 526 (1932).
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of his earning capacity. The court may take into consideration
his capacity to earn money by personal attention to business.42
If he will not exert himself, his capacity for earning will be esti-
mated by the court. If it were otherwise, a husband, by deliberate
intent or disinclination to work, might defeat or avoid his marital
obligation of support.
The court in determining earning capacity may consider the
husband's intelligence, education, refinement and experience.4 3
Where the husband is young, able-bodied, vigorous and in good
health the court may consider these things as evidence to show
the earning capacity of the husband and may increase the alimony
of the wife.44 For example, in a case where the husband was in
the service at the time of the divorce and his salary was $2,000
a year, and when he was released his earnings were $10,000 a year,
this increase in earning capacity was held to justify an increase
in the alimony for the divorced wife.4 5
(b) Increase or Reduction in Husband's Income
The fact that the husband's salary or income has been increased
or decreased does not in itself automatically entitle the wife to an
increase in the amount of alimony nor the husband a reduction
in alimony. The courts have held that every case should be de-
termined on its own facts with the aim of doing justice between
the parties in view of all the conditions.4 6
In Burr v. Burr4 7 the wife petitioned for an increase in alimony
after the showing of a somewhat substantial increase in the hus-
band's income. The court failed to increase her alimony on the
grounds that an increase of the husband's income is not sufficient
reason for modifying the provision for permanent alimony since
she made no showing of a change in her needs or circumstances.
42 Robins v. Robins, 106 N.J.Eq. 198, 150 A. 340 (1930). In this case the
husband, a physician, had an established practice and was earning about
$40,000 a year. He voluntarily abandoned it and took a position
where he earned $3100 a year. He sought a reduction of the alimony
decree. The court refused to modify the decree on the grounds he
had the capacity to earn enough money to satisfy the alimony decree.
See also: Faye v. Faye, 131 Misc. 388, 226 N.Y.S. 729 (1928).
43 Farlee v. Farlee, 101 N.J.Eq. 111, 137 A. 648 (1927).
44 Rasberry v. Rasberry, 189 Ky. 502, 225 S.W. 148 (1920).
45 Humbird v. Humbird, 42 Idaho 29, 243 P. 827 (1926).
46 Strickland v. Strickland, 183 Or. 297, 192 P.2d 986 (1948); Bahlman
v. Bahlman, 218 Ala. 519, 119 So. 210 (1928).
47 313 Mich. 330, 21 N.W.2d 150 (1946).
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The fact of a substantial reduction in or cessation of the hus-
band's income alone does not necessarily entitle him to a reduc-
tion in alimony. If the husband is able to make the payments as
originally ordered notwithstanding the reduction in his income,
and the other facts of the case make it proper to continue the
payments, the court may refuse to modify the decree.
48
The Alabama Court in Culton v. Culton 49 had this comment to
make:
Modification . . . can only be ordered on proof of change of
conditions of the parties, one or both, as the decree is final as to
the conditions existing at the time, since existing conditions are
presumed to have been considered upon the rendition of the de-
cree .... We must proceed on the assumption that the decree
rendered was equitable and fair. Any anticipated increase in in-
come on the part of the husband at that time, which may not have
materialized, cannot be considered as a ground for reducing ali-
mony payments to the former wife.
(c) Unemployment of the Husband
It is recognized that the husband's unemployment may justify
a reduction in or suspension of alimony if he is not able to make
the payments.50 That "one cannot get blood out of a turnip" is
a truism particularly applicable to an improvident husband.
The court may hold that the husband's application for relief
is premature where, although he is unemployed, there is a reason-
able prospect that he will soon be able to secure employment and
be able to comply with the decree at present.51
Where the husband's unemployment is self-inflicted and he is
able to work, the court may hold that there is no substantial
change in circumstances, or that the husband's plight does not
entitle him to relief.5 2
48 Seigfreid v. Seigfreid, 187 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. App. 1945); Heard v. Heard,
116 A. 67 (1933); Primrose v. Primrose, 217 Miss. 316, 97 So. 418 (1923).
4) 252 Ala. 442, 444, 41 So.2d 398, 399 (1949).
50 Warner v. Warner, 145 Or. 541, 28 P.2d 625 (1934). The husband
was incapacitated and in the hospital and was receiving only $72 a
month as a pension. The court reduced the former wife's alimony
from $50 per month to $35.
51 Tidmore v. Tidmore, 248 Ala. 150, 26 So.2d 905 (1946). Here the di-
vorce decree was rendered on September 8, 1945, and evidence was
taken early in January, 1946, on husband's application for reduction
of alimony allowed in divorce decree. Application denied on grounds
husband had not waited long enough to fix a permanent change.
52 Note 42 supra.
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(d) Business Fluctuations
Where a husband is engaged in a business which, like most
enterprises, is subject to fluctuations, the fact that his business
has had a poor season will not require a reduction in alimony if
he is able to continue the payments without seriously impairing
his ability to conduct his business. This situation is one which
permits the application of another general rule that the court
will not grant a modification of a decree on grounds of an occur-
rence which was probably foreseen and taken into account when
the original decree was entered.53
(e) Acquisition of Property
In some jurisdictions it is held that in determining the amount
which the husband is able to pay at the time of his application
for a reduction of alimony, the fact that the husband has some
hopes of gifts from his father or others who have assisted him
financially cannot be considered in determining what the husband
is able to pay.54 The wife is entitled to demand from the husband
only such support as he is reasonably able to furnish from his own
property.55 The other view seems to be that a husband's acquisi-
tion of a substantial amount of property after the entry of the
decree for alimony may be a factor to be considered in determ-
ining whether to increase the payments on an application by the
wife for modification of the alimony decree.
3. Change in Needs of Parties
Attention is now turned from the first variable, the husband's
aiblity to pay, to the consideration of the second major compon-
ent of the basic alimony equation, the needs of the wife. A sub-
stantial change in the requirements of the divorced wife for her
support is held by many courts as furnishing the basis for modi-
fication of the alimony order. The ability of the wife to earn her
own living is a factor which enters into the computation of the
original award, and also, in some jurisdictions in determining
whether that award should be modified.
It should be noted however that even where the courts reduce
alimony because the wife has secured employment, the reduction
is not ordinarily equal to the amount of her earnings. The courts
53 Bailes v. Bailes, 220 Ala. 177, 124 So. 214 (1929).
54 Merritt v. Merritt, 220 Cal. 85, 29 P.2d 190 (1934).
55 Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933).
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seem to feel the wife should be encouraged to seek employment,
but if her alimony were reduced in the exact sum of her earnings
she would have little incentive to work. One court 6 stated that
if allowed, the effect would be to deprive the wife of part of her
alimony and to discourage her from making any attempt to regain
her position as a useful member of society. Therefore, the courts
tend to reduce alimony by a fraction of the wife's earnings, the
amount of the fraction varying with the facts of each case.5 7
It has been held that if the wife is able to work and there is
no good reason why she should not do so but she had made little
or no effort to secure employment the court may take this factor
into consideration when determining whether to reduce alimony.
The California Supreme Court5" in affirming an order reducing
alimony said:
... a trial court, in awarding alimony, should not do so in
a sum inducing idleness on the part of the ex-wife....
Thousands of women and girls are now employed, where for-
merly men and boys were once found. The employment of women
in all lines of work is now so general that it may almost be said
to be a mark of distinction for a woman to be self-supporting.
In the writer's opinion a more preferable way of handling
the situation where women are capable of earning their own liv-
ing but prefer to live off their alimony, is to make an award of
alimony for only a short period, such as one year, so as to give
the wife the means of support when she needs it and terminate
the payments when she should be working. In jurisdictions where
this is done the decree usually does not preclude the wife from
applying within the time period for -a continuance of the alimony
payments if needed.5 9 The New Hampshire Legislature has en-
acted a statute 0 which provides for the awarding of alimony for
three years ". . . such order may be renewed, modified or extended
if justice requires for periods of not more than three years at a
time ......
The courts seem to be in agreement that where the wife has
become seriously ill or her physical condition is such as to require
increased expenditures for medical or personal care this may
justify an increase in alimony. Even if a husband's salary or in-
156 Curry v. Curry, 102 Colo. 381, 79 P.2d 653 (1938).
U Fisher v. Fisher, 237 Ky. 823, 36 S.W.2d 635 (1931).
58 Lamborn v. Lamborn, 80 Cal. App. 494, 251 P. 943, 944 (1926).
59 Williamson v. Williamson, 154 Fla. 200, 17 So.2d 78 (1944).
00 N. Hamp. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458.19 (1955).
1006
RES JUDICATA IN THE DIVORCE COURTS
come does not increase, if there is a material increase in his ex-
wife's needs, the ex-husband may be required to pay more alimony.
In Tome v. Tome 6 1 the court rescinded a previous order reducing
the amount of permanent alimony which the husband had been
required to pay and again ordered the husband to pay the original
sum which had been required at the time the divorce was decreed.
This was done upon the showing by the former wife that she was
ill, in need of medical attention and unable to work and despite
the fact that the husband's financial condition had not improved
and he had married again.
Illness or a change in capacity of the husband to earn a liveli-
hood may be grounds for reducing alimony payments. His ill
health is not ground for obtaining a reduction, however, unless it
represents a development subsequent to the original order and
thus something the court did not have before it for consideration
when the original order was made.62
It is obvious from what has been presented above that the
modification of alimony awards, like their granting in the first
instance, cannot be reduced to any rigid legal formulas. Many
different factors which vary in each case must be taken into ac-
count. Judges must exercise a broad, wise discretion based on
knowledge of all facts.
4. Remarriage of the Parties
One of the most shocking things about alimony is that a woman
can be supported by two husband's and that a woman's remarriage
does not in the majority of states necessarily terminate the obliga-
tion of the first husband to pay the amounts decreed by the court.
There are only seven states6 3 by statute that make termination
of alimony mandatory on a showing that the wife has remarried.
In the majority of states the first husband must apply to the court
for the elimination of his obligation to pay alimony to his former
wife and usually must show a change of conditions which justify
termination. If he delays in making the request, he may find
that he has to pay alimony up to the date of his petition and cannot
have alimony terminated as of the date of the wife's remarriage.
61 180 Md. 31, 22 A.2d 549 (1941).
62 Altenbach v. Altenbach, 162 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App. 1942).
63 Cal. Civ. Code § 139 (1957); Colo. Rev. Stat. c. 46-1-5 (1953); IMI. Ann.
Stat. c. 40, § 19 (1956); Mont. Rev. Code tit. 21-139 (1947); Nev. Rev.




Where it is the ex-husband who remarries, this fact usually
has no effect on the alimony he must pay to his former wife. The
courts are apparently committed to the view that a husband's re-
marriage and its attendant financial burden may not be success-
fully urged in support of a petition for modification.6 4 Voluntary
assumption of new family obligations which diminish the husband's
ability to comply with the terms of the decree should not, it is
thought, avail him in avoiding the duty to support his former wife
which is embodied in the alimony order.
The courts seem to take the view that the husband's primary
obligation is to his first wife and he must therefore continue to
pay her the full amount of alimony that was decreed.6 5 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court66 stated they realized that duties of support
are owed to the second wife as well as to the first but pointed out:
"The first wife has first consideration and her necessities will not
be unreasonably curtailed, or her wants ignored."
It appears that the first wife must therefore be preferred,
even though the husband's interest and desires are bound up with
the second wife and any children that he may have by her. In
refusing to take into account the needs of the second wife and of
his second family, the courts may simply promote the breakup of
the second marriage. This policy is doubtless intended to dis-
courage future marital alliances on the part of those whose fi-
nancial means are inadequate for the support of both families.
C. ALIMONY IN GROSS
An allowance of permanent alimony, where payable in money,
is either a lump sum payable on or near the rendition of the decree
of divorce, a lump sum payable in installments, or an allowance of
periodical payments without limitation as to time for a fixed
period without designation of the total amount to be paid.67 The
award of alimony in a lump sum is often referred to as alimony in
gross.
As a general proposition, an award of alimony in gross is final
and binding. These matters are adjudications of the court as to
64 Simpson v. Simpson, 51 Idaho 99, 4 P.2d 345 (1931); Stone v. Stone, 212
Iowa 1344, 235 N.W. 492 (1931); Aiken v. Aiken, 221 Ala. 67, 127 So.
819 (1930).
6 Rodgers v. Rodgers, 102 Colo. 94, 76 P.2d 1104 (1938).
66 McIlwain v. McIlwain, 135 Neb. 705, 283 N.W. 845 (1939).
07 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment 14.23 2d Ed. (1945).
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the rights of those involved in the suit, and hence they are binding
the same as any other adjudication and are not subject to modifi-
cation.68
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Ziegenbein v. Damme0 had
this to say: "An unqualified allowance of alimony in gross . . . is
such a definite and final adjustment of mutual rights and obliga-
tions between husband and wife as to be capable of a present
vesting and to constitute an absolute judgment. Such an allow-
ance is not subject to modification."
The Illinois Appellate Court 70 after a detailed review of the
cases on alimony in gross arrived at these conclusions:
... Alimony in gross or gross alimony is always for a definite
amount of money; the payment is always for a definite length of
time; it is always a charge upon the husband's estate....
That the award may be payable in installments is not deter-
minative of the question as to whether it is gross alimony or per-
iodic alimony. Gross alimony may be payable in installments-
whether all cash or all or partly on credit does not affect the es-
sential nature of the transaction. The principle involved is that
gross alimony becomes a vested right from the date of the rendi-
tion of the judgment, and the manner of its payment in no wise
affects its nature or effect .... It would favor the affluent over
the one less fortiutously circumstanced....
The gross sum, when paid, will operate as a discharge and
satisfaction in full for all claim for future support of the wife....
There are seventeen states71 in which the courts, by statute,
may award alimony in gross instead of requiring that regular,
continuing payments be made for support.
68 Fitch v. Fitch, 229 Iowa 344, 294 N.W. 577 (1940); Magginis v. Magginis,
323 Ill. 113, 153 N.E. 654 (1926); Booth v. Booth, 114 Kan. 377, 219 P.
513 (1923); Kraft v. Kraft, 193 Iowa 602, 187 N.W. 449 (1922).
69 138 Neb. 320, 292 N.W. 921 (1940).
70 Walters v. Walters, 341 Ill. App. 561, 568, 94 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1950).
71 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-319 (1956); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7335 (1949); Del.
Code Ann. c. 13, § 1531 (1953); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 40, § 19 (1956); Ind.
Stat. Ann. § 3-1218 (1957); Kan. Gen. Stat. c. 60, § 1511 (1949); Me.
Rev. Stat. c. 166, § 63 (1954); Mich. Stat. Ann. c. 25.103 (1957); Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 452.080 (1949); N. Mex. Stat. § 22-7-6 (1953); Ohio Gen.
Code § 11992 (1938); Old. Stat. Ann. § 12:1278 (1937); Or. Rev. Stat.
c. 107.100 (1957); R. I. Gen. Laws, § 15-5-6 (1956); S. Car. Code of Laws




E. RES JUDICATA7 2
The doctrine of res judicata is based upon the public policy
of finality of litigation. Its purpose is to prevent an attempt to
relitigate in some way. Because res judicata occupies a place of
such major importance, there is a great need for clarity and sharp
distinction among the various concepts embodied in this doctrine
and a more precise system of terminology to furnish a sound guide
for decision.
The principle that an adjudication by a court having jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter and the parties is final and conclusive
not only as to the matters actually determined, but as to every
other matter which the parties might have litigated as incident
thereto and coming within the legitimate purview of the subject
matter of the action, although not formally put in issue therein,
applies to divorce actions and the modification of alimony de-
crees as well as to other kinds of actions. Since the establishment
of changed conditions is generally a condition precedent to relief,
it becomes pertient to inquire what new circumstances will war-
rant a modification of the alimony order. As discussed above,
this is left to the discretion of the trial judge. There is no basic
standard. He determines, in his own discretion, in each case
whether there is a changed condition or whether the issue was or
should have been determined in the original action. It is not in-
conceivable that he could be swayed by personal feelings. The
decisions of the trial judge with respect to this issue will not be
overruled on appeal unless his action constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion. There is great difficulty encountered in estimating
what amounts to such an abuse of discretion.
The courts seem to have difficulty in applying the doctrine of
res judicata to modification of alimony cases. These cases seem
to present the problem of determining just what alimony is res
judicata of. There is also the problem of two standards, one for
the wife and another for the husband, used in determining when
and what constitutes changed conditions or circumstances which
will warrant a modification of the alimony award.
An example of one pattern which the courts seem to follow
is in cases where the original alimony award is unconscionably
72 See generally: 17 Am. Jur. § 719 (1957); Developments in the Law-
Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952); Williams, Res Judicata in
Recent Cases, 13 Modern L. Rev. 307 (1950); Bouer, The Doctrine of
Res Judicata (1924); Doctrine of Res Judicata in Divorce Proceedings,
40 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases 878, 1916B.
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low because that is all the money the husband can pay as com-
pared with the situation where the original award is adequate
to sustain the wife. Then add the factor in both situations where
the husband has a sudden increase in earnings or an inheritance.
in the first situation where the original award was unconscionably
low the courts do and should modify the award. In the second
situation the courts do not always and should not modify the
original award.
The requirement of showing a material change of circumstances
in connection with an application to modify alimony rests not only
upon the doctrine of res judicata but also upon the general prin-
ciple underlying that doctrine that there must be an end to litiga-
tion. A court, having performed its function of ruling upon a
controversy, cannot be taken over by a particular set of litigants
for the continued readjudication and reconsideration of their af-
fairs. Besides wasting the time of the courts and litigants, to
permit the multiple actions leaves an undesirable uncertainty in
the economic affairs of those subject to them.
IV. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Where a marriage breaks up, then the problem of who is
entitled to what or who gets what property, is a matter of vital
importance. Although a husband and wife cannot change their
marital status by contract, they may contract with each other
as to the status of their property. This division of the property
may be accomplished either by an actual apportionment of the
property itself or by periodic or lump sum payments. These pay-
ments, although they may be made for the purpose of support
and maintenance, are not alimony since they are part of the prop-
erty settlement and are in lieu of property rights.7 3 Or the agree-
ment may be one in which the payments for the support and
maintenance of the wife are in the form of alimony.
73 Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947). The court held
there are three general categories into which fall agreements entered
into by husband and wife: "(1) . . . contracts in which the support
and maintenance provisions are in the nature of alimony, whether in
lump sum or monthly payments, and are separable from the provisions
that divide the property. (2) . . . contracts in which support and
maintenance provisions are not in nature of alimony but are part of
the division of property; also, includes contracts that provide solely
for the payment of monthly or lump sums in lieu of community prop-
erty. (3) ... contracts in which wife wvaives all support and main-
tenance, except as provided in the agreement, in consideration of a
more favorable division of community property."
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Under the common law, separation agreements were wholly
unenforceable. Today however, the agreements "are not only en-
forceable if they conform with the customary requirements for a
valid contract, are fair, and are not made primarily to facilitate
the procurement of a divorce, but they are to be commended.74
It seems that where the husband and wife cannot agree to a
property settlement, they are creating trouble for themselves in
the future. In the first place, the statutes of many states do not
give the divorce courts the complete control of the real and per-
sonal property of both spouses which is necessary for an equitable
division of the property and a liquidation of the marriage. 75 Sec-
ondly, many of the property distribution statutes penalize the
guilty spouse in a divorce action" 6 even though this is giving the
court the right to punish for misconduct without specifying in
any way the nature and extent of such punishment.
Ordinarily, assuming the agreement is otherwise valid, the
court in an action for divorce will usually approve and adopt such
an agreement in the divorce decree if properly presented for the
consideration of the court."7 The agreement may be strengthened
by a decree which has adopted or approved it.
74 Allen v. Allen, 196 Okla. 36, 162 P.2d 193 (1945). The court said:
"Contracts between spouses for the settlement of their property rights
in contemplation of divorce have a recognized part in our legal struc-
ture. . . ." In Hensley v. Hensley, 179 Cal. 284, 183 P. 445 (1918) the
court said: 'Property settlements . . . when there is no fraud, are
highly favored in the law."
76 Report of Minn. Comm. on Demestic Relations Problems (1951), p. 15:
"Judges who have had an occasion to attempt to divide the property
of the parties in a divorce action realize that the present statutes are
not adequate . . . in a situation where the wife has been able to get
the property in her name. If she gets the divorce, the court can do
nothing about it. We propose that the judge who bears the divorce
action can make such distribution of the property of the parties ac-
quired during marriage, held either in joint tenancy or in separate
estates, as shall appear just and equitable. This will make it possible
to bring about a more just result and also to avoid subsequent un-
necessary and expensive litigation."
76 Ark. Stat. Ann. c. 34, § 1214 (1947); Cal. Civ. Code, § 146 (1957); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 12, § 1531 (1953); Idaho Code § 32-712 (1947); Ill. Ann.
Stat. c. 40, § 18 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 166, § 65 (1954); Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 208, § 27 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.150 (1955). See also:
Tobin v. Tobin, 89 Old. 12, 213 P. 884 (1923).
77 Cahill v. Cahill, 316 Ill. App. 324, 45 N.E.2d 69 (1942); Makzoume v.
Makzoume, 50 Cal. App.2d 229, 123 P.2d 72 (1942); Wheeler v. Wheeler,
167 Okl. 598, 32 P.2d 305 (1934).
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If husband and wife have agreed upon a distribution of prop-
erty and have not made any provisions for a periodic allowance,
the court rarely alters the agreement.78 To add alimony to an
adopted agreement usually alters the agreement itself. The court
would be changing the obligation of the parties. It is submitted
that the court should not act differently toward a contract merely
because it calls for an allowance. Such a contract is calculated to
make a property settlement just as much as an agreement which
provides for an exchange of property without an allowance.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in the majority of jurisdic-
tions. The general rule seems to be that if the agreement of the
parties is incorporated into the divorce decree, the rights of the
parties are governed by the decree and not by the agreement, and
the terms thereof may thereafter be modified by the court. 9 The
feeling of the courts seems to be where a court has the general
power to plodify a decree for alimony or support, the exercise
of that power is not affected by the fact that the decree is based
on an agreement entered into by the parties to the action.
V. CONCLUSION
It is the writer's opinion that the position of the woman in
the marriage relation has been so altered as to render a change
advisable in our legal attitude toward alimony. In the period
when the law of alimony was largely shaped and fixed, the wife
had very little property apart from her husband and had no means
of help if she left him or called him to a legal accounting. Today
she has her separate property and ways and opportunities of earn-
ing a livelihood outside of the home and independently of her
husband. It is inevitable that this rise toward parity should alter
the old justification for alimony.
Alimony maintains a distasteful link with the dissolved part-
nership. When the marriage has reached the stage of divorce
it is bankrupt. It should be liquidated as quickly and conveniently
as possible. When the liquidation is complete, both the husband
78 Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945); Bishop v. Bishop,
354 Mo. 741, 162 S.W.2d 332 (1942); Shankland v. Shankland, 301 I11.
524, 134 N.E. 67 (1922); Murray v. Murray, 28 Cal. App. 533, 153 P.
248 (1915).
79. Perry v. Perry, 183 Tenn. 362, 192 S.W.2d 830 (1946); Miller v. Miller,
317 I11. App. 447, 46 N.E.2d 102 (1943); Innes v. McColgan, 47 Cal. App.2d
781, 118 P.2d 855 (1941); McHan v. McHan, 59 Idaho 496, 84 P.2d 984
(1938); Warrington v. Warrington, 160 Or. 77, 83 P.2d 479 (1938);
Shoop v. Shoop, 58 S.D. 593, 237 N.W. 904 (1931).
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and wife should be able to start life anew. They should not be
compelled to try to make a new life while hampered and encum-
bered by legal ties and obligations to a dissolved marriage.
Where there are children, the idea of complete discharge from
the obligations of a former marriage should not apply. Someone
must support the children until they can support themselves, or
until they have reached their majority. A man who has gone
through a divorce cannot and should not escape the necessity of
supporting his children. He will therefore be required to make
payments for many years after the divorce.
But, in about half of the divorces, the man and woman in-
volved have no children; only they are concerned with what hap-
pens subsequent to the divorce. It should be possible then to
liquidate their marriage so that each can start a new life free
from the encumberances of the old.
There is a great deal to be said in support of the lump sum
settlement or alimony in gross idea. The amount should depend
on such factors as the length of marriage, the size of the husband's
income and estate, her age, health, ability to work, her own income
and estate and the standard of living formerly maintained by the
parties. The amount allotted to the wife should be sufficient to
enable her to make the transition from her former position to
that of a single woman who must stand on her own feet. Where
men do not have all the money at one time, it can be paid in install-
ments.
Once this sum fixed by the court is paid, the matter of alimony
should be finished. The parties should in all respects then be
considered as single individuals. The wife should no longer have
any claim on her former husband for support. The courts would
not continually be bothered by applications to modify alimony
where conditions between husband and wife change, nor would
they be used as a collection agency every time husbands fall into
arrears. Both the husband and wife would be able to plan their
futures more intelligently. The wife would know exactly how
much money she could count on and the husband would know
how much money he must provide her with before he would be
free to start a new life.
As discussed earlier in the article, there are a few states that
have understood that a lump sum alimony payment, of a fixed
amount which would confine and limit a man's obligation to his
former wife, is preferable to the usual type of decree which pro-
vides alimony in a fixed amount for an indefinite period which
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may extend through a lifetime and may be constantly altered.
In general, however, the courts have been hostile to lump sum
payments.
Also, in our alimony statutes economic realities have gotten
confused with the guilt principle underlying our entire divorce
structure. The amount of alimony awarded and the modification
of that award is greatly influenced by the courts decision as to
who is the guilty party and who is the innocent party. Couples
should not be compelled to stay together for financial reasons.
It seems as if much agitation for the alteration of a decree
could be avoided by the framing of the original award with a
view to reasonable and ordinary changes that may likely occur in
the relations of the parties. Where factors which are reasonably
certain to affect the circumstances of the parties can be anticipated,
allowance therefore in the decree would preserve its essential
soundness in the face of these changes. An agreement, between
the parties, could be drafted with an "escalator clause." In other
civil actions and transactions parties contract as to probable future
consequences. They are not then allowed to constantly come into
court for a modification of their contract everytime there is a
change or fluctuation in conditions or circumstances. The same
principle should apply to alimony awards and their modification.
Some states have attempted by statute to alter this situation
of never ending litigation as to amount of alimony. New Hamp-
shire 0 has a rule which prohibits a court from granting to a wife
more than three years alimony where there are no children of
the marriage. At the end of the three year period, the husband
may be ordered to pay for an additional three year period if there
is a good reason. Unless the wife is physically or mentally inca-
pacited, however, it is not likely that she will be awarded alimony
for longer than the first period which gives her a chance to make
whatever adjustments are necessary for her to make before she
starts earning her own living.
In North Carolina, 8 ' Pennsylvania,8 2 except for an insane wife,
and Texas 3 permanent alimony has been abolished. These legis-
latures have taken the position that the duty to support is an
80 N. Hamp. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 458.19 (1955).
81 N. Car. Gen. Stat. § 50-11 (1950).
82 Penn. Stat. Ann. tit. 23 (1955).
83 Tex. Civ. Stat. § 4637 (1951).
1015
1016 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
incident of marriage and that once the marriage is terminated-
regardless of where the fault or guilt lies-there is not justification
for burdening the husband with the support of his former wife.
These four states have taken a realistic attitude toward ali-
mony. The legislatures have taken the millstone from around
the husband's neck. They have set the trend for the remainder
of the states to follow.
